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Abstract
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated
to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2)
manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent￿s
action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of
the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide
as u ﬃcient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of
the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse.
This shows that information content is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
for a performance measure to be valuable.
∗Currently at Columbia University. Email: vl2108@columbia.edu. I thank Tim Baldenius, John
Christensen, Ralf Ewert, Christian Laux, Helmut Laux, Joshua Ronen and conference participants at
the 2003 European Accounting Association Annual Meeting in Seville, the 2003 Accounting Research
Workshop in Stuttgart and the 2003 European Economic Association Annual Meeting in Stockholm
for their helpful comments.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The controllability principle is one of the most discussed principles in the accounting
literature. The conditional controllability principle is based on Holmstr￿m￿s (1979)
informativeness principle and states that managers should be evaluated on the basis
of all information that provides insights into their actions (Antle and Demski 1988).
The puzzle is, however, that ￿rms often seem to disregard this principle. In his ￿eld
study, Merchant (1987, 1989) explores performance measures in ￿rms. He shows that
￿rms typically use a strict subset of the available informative performance measures
for evaluation purposes. While this is not consistent with the above literature which
has focused on single-task settings, this paper develops a multi-task agency model
that may rationalize this phenomenon.
Im o d e la￿rm in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to pursue two
tasks: (1) to evaluate a new project (evaluation task) and, if the project is adopted,
(2) to manage it diligently in order to increase the expected outcome of the project
(managerial task). When the agent works on the evaluation task, he obtains more
accurate information regarding the quality of the project. The agent is supposed to
adopt the project if the obtained information is favorable and to reject the project
otherwise. The agent￿s pay can be based on the outcome of the project and on an
additional performance measure which is informative of the managerial task.
If the agent does not have to evaluate the project, the setting becomes a standard
agency problem. In this case, the performance measure is valuable because it can be
used to improve the risk sharing of the contract (Holmstr￿m 1979). However, if the
agent must be motivated to work on both the evaluation and the managerial task, this
result no longer holds. I provide a suﬃcient condition under which the performance
measure is completely useless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. The
intuition for this result is as follows. In order to provide incentives for the evaluation
task, the contract must impose risk on the agent (Lambert 1986). Given this risk,
there are situations in which the contract does not have to reinforce the managerial
2task. In other words, in this two-task setting, the incentive constraint of the man-
agerial task might be slack. In this case, the performance measure cannot be used
to improve the risk sharing of the contract since it is informative of the managerial
task only: Using the performance measure to reduce the risk would eliminate incen-
tives for the evaluation task. The performance measure is more likely to be useless
if the ￿rst control problem (the evaluation task) is relatively severe compared to the
second control problem (the managerial task). This result is intuitive since the prob-
lem of motivating the evaluation task is then more likely to dominate the problem of
motivating the managerial task.
There is a large literature on the value of additional performance measures. Holm-
str￿m (1979) shows that a performance measure is valuable for contracting purposes
if it is informative, i.e., if it provides information not included in the existing measures
(informativeness criterion). Feltham and Xie (1994) expand this result for multiple
tasks. Starting with Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991), researchers discuss settings in
which the informativeness criterion does not apply. Holmstr￿m and Milgrom show
that using information to encourage a particular task may have an adverse impact
on the performance of other tasks. Hence, it may be optimal to ignore this informa-
tion in the incentive contract. Cremer (1995) and Yim (2001) allow for renegotiable
contracts. In Cremer￿s work, the principal may abstain from additional monitoring
information because more information makes it more diﬃcult to commit to threats
and, therefore, makes it more costly to provide accurate incentives. Closest to my
paper is Arya et al. (1998). They assume that the agent has to pursue two tasks and
that two performance measures are available for contracting. One of the two measures
is sensitive to both actions. Due to this spillover eﬀect, it may be optimal to base the
compensation only on this measure to induce both actions and to ignore the other.
While Arya et al. assume risk neutrality, I consider managerial risk aversion. This
allows me to characterize situations where additional information cannot be used to
improve the risk sharing of the contract.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and provides a formal statement of the problem under consideration. In Section 3, I
analyze a benchmark situation in which the agent is only involved in the managerial
task. In this case, the informative performance measure is always valuable. In Section
4, I present the main result that the performance measure may be worthless if the
agent is involved in both the evaluation and the managerial task. Section 5 considers
other modeling assumptions and shows that the main result remains to hold. Section
6 concludes.
2M o d e l
There are two parties: a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent. The principal
owns a project. Let y ∈ {0,1} be an indicator variable that denotes whether the
project is undertaken or not. If y =0 , the project is rejected and the game ends.
If y =1 , the project is undertaken and the attendant capital outlay is Io.T h e
project￿s gross pro￿ts, x ∈ (0,∞], depend on the project quality, θ ∈ {0,1}, and the
managerial eﬀort level, m ∈ (0,∞], delivered by the agent. For simplicity, I assume
that the production function has the form
x = θX(m), (1)
where X0(m) > 0,X 00(m) ≤ 0,X 0(0) > 0,X (0) = 0.1 The agent￿s choice of m is
unobservable to the principal and the disutility of exerting eﬀort m is simply m.T h e
quality of the project is either bad, θ =0 , or good, θ =1 . The ex ante probability of
the good and the bad quality is commonly known to be 0.5.L e txT ≡ X(mT) be the
target output requested by the principal if the investment is undertaken. That is, the
principal requires the agent to deliver managerial input m = mT. The target output
1To ensure strictly positive managerial eﬀort choices in equilibrium, I assume that x0(0) is suﬃ-
ciently large.
4xT (and thereby the level mT) is determined by the principal endogenously. When
the agent chooses m ≥ mT and the project quality is good, then the output will meet
the target budget, i.e., x ≥ xT. Otherwise, it will not, i.e., x<x T.N o t e t h a t t h e
output x is only informative of the agent￿s action if the quality of the project is good
(and m>0). If the quality is bad, the output will be zero with certainty. This has
two implications: There are only two outcomes that must be considered; x =0and
x = xT.2 If x =0 , the principal cannot tell whether the agent has cheated (m =0 )
or was unlucky (θ =0 ). If, on the other hand, x = xT, the principal knows that the
agent has chosen the desired eﬀort level (m = mT). Note that the main result of this
paper does not hinge on this assumption. In Section 5, I show that the qualitative
results remain to hold if the outcome x = xT is also not (perfectly) informative of the
action m.
The agent is able to acquire better information about the quality of the project
prior to investment. Let the agent￿s evaluation eﬀort, e, be either 0 or 1. When the
agent evaluates the project, e =1 , he receives a signal s ∈ {sG,s B} that is informative
of the quality of the project. The good (bad) signal indicates that the quality of the
project is more likely to be good (bad). More precisely,
Pr[s = sG|θ =1 ]=P r [ s = sB|θ =0 ]=0 .5+i,
where i ∈ (0,0.5] is exogenous. If the posterior signal is sG (sB), then the project
quality is good (bad) with probability (0.5+i) and bad (good) with probability
(0.5 − i). If i =0 .5, the signal s is a perfect proxy for the project quality. When i
decreases the signal becomes more noisy but remains informative. Unless otherwise
speci￿ed, I assume that the signal is not perfect, i.e., i<0.5. The evaluation task is
associated with eﬀort cost k>0. The principal knows the magnitude of k but cannot
observe whether the agent has incurred the cost or not.
2If the outcome lies in between these two values, the principal concludes that the agent has
cheated and punishes him severely.
5Moreover, I make the following assumptions: The agent observes the signal s
privately and has the authority to make the investment decision.3 I shall say that the
agent implements the project if he chooses y =1and m = mT. The principal wants
the agent to implement the project, if s = sG and to reject the project, if s = sB.T h e
investment outlay Io is assumed to be suﬃciently high so that the principal always
￿nds it pro￿table to provide incentives for the evaluation task.
The risk neutral principal maximizes the expected value of (x − Io)y less the
compensation payment w. The agent￿s utility depends on his salary w and the actions
taken. His utility function is additively separable of the form u(w) − ke− m, where
u0(w) > 0,u 00(w) < 0,u (0) = 0. The outcome x and the investment decision y are
veri￿able, i.e., compensation payments can be based on x and y. Given the structure
of the problem, it is suﬃcient to consider three diﬀerent wage payments. Let wH
be the compensation payment if the agent provides the target output, x ≥ xT , and
wL be the wage payment if he does not, x<x T . If the agent rejects the project, he
receives a so-called rejection wage, w0. Clearly, given this wage contract, the agent
either chooses m = mT o rn o tt ow o r ka ta l l ,m =0 .
The objective of this paper is to discuss the value of a performance measure M
which is informative of m.4 For simplicity, I assume that the measure M is a perfect
proxy for m, i.e., M = m. Given the information content of x, the measure M
provides additional insights into the agent￿s action m since if the project quality is
bad, x tells us nothing about m. If the measure M is available, the principal can base
wage payments not only on x and y but on M. The measure M allows the principal to
enforce the desired managerial eﬀort level simply by penalizing the agent if he chooses
any eﬀort level other than the desired one. Unless otherwise speci￿ed, I assume that
3Equivalently, the authority to make the investment decision may remain with headquarters. In
this case, the manager is asked to report the signal s and headquarters accepts or rejects the project
a c c o r d i n gt oap r e s p e c i ￿ed rule. See Melumad and Reichelstein (1987).
4Informative in the sense that M adds information about m that is not already conveyed by x.
6the performance measure M is not available for contracting.
The interaction between the principal and the agent proceeds as follows. The prin-
cipal oﬀers the contract (wH,w L,w 0,x T). The agent chooses whether to participate
in the relationship or not. He will do so if his expected utility exceeds his reservation
utility which is normalized to zero. If the agent participates, he decides whether to
evaluate the project and chooses to undertake (y =1 )or to reject (y =0 )it. If
y =1 , the agent chooses his eﬀort supply m.T h ei n v e s t m e n td e c i s i o n ,y, and the re-
alized outcome, x, are observed publicly and the agent is reimbursed. The interaction
between the principal and the agent is not repeated.
The following notation is helpful. Let uj denote the agent￿s utility associated
with a wage payment wj, where j ∈ {H,L,0}. Let Φ denote the inverse of the agent￿s
utility function u. Throughout the paper Φ000 is assumed to be nonnegative. This is
equivalent to assuming that the risk tolerance ρ ≡−
u0(w)
u00(w) does not increase too fast
with wealth, i.e., wealth eﬀects are suﬃciently small.5 This assumption is not required
for the main results, but allows some comparative statics results to be presented in a
simpler form. Let
Π ≡ 0.5[(0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT]+0 .5u0 − k
denote the agent￿s ex ante (expected) utility if he chooses to evaluate the project and
t oi m p l e m e n ti t( y =1and m = mT)i fs = sG and to reject it (y =0and m =0 )i f
s = sB. Using this notation, the principal￿s problem (P) is the following
5More precisely, one can show that Φ000 ≥ 0 is ful￿lled if ρ0 ≤ 2.
7max
mT,uH,uL,u0
0.5[(0.5+i)(X(mT)−Φ(uH))+(0.5−i)(0−Φ(uL))−I
o]−0.5Φ(u0) (T)
subject to
Π ≥ 0.5uH +0 .5uL − mT, (ICe1)
Π ≥ u0, (ICe2)
u0 ≥ uL, (ICm)
Π ≥ 0. (IR)
The objective function (T) re￿ects the principal￿s desire to maximize ￿rm value.
The ￿rst two constraints ensure that the agent (weakly) prefers to evaluate the project
rather than to implement it (ICe1)o rt or e j e c ti t( ICe2) without acquiring additional
information. Constraint (ICm) ensures that the agent (weakly) prefers to reject the
project rather than to cause a project failure by choosing y =1and m =0 .F i -
nally, the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures that the agent receives his
reservation utility of zero in expectation.
Note that there are some additional incentive constraints I have omitted. These
constraints are redundant since they are implied by (ICe1), (ICe2), (ICm)a n d( IR).
Next, these constraints are brie￿y mentioned. Constraint ΠG ≡ (0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 −
i)uL − mT ≥ u0 ensures that the agent prefers to implement the project (y =1and
m = mT) after having obtained the good signal rather than to reject the project. This
constraint is implied by (ICe2). Constraint u0 ≥ ΠB ≡ (0.5−i)uH +(0.5+i)uL−mT
ensures that the agent prefers to reject the project after having obtained the bad
signal rather than to implement it. This constraint is implied by (ICe1). Constraint
Π ≥ uL ensures that the agent will not cause a project failure by choosing y =1
and m =0 . T h i si si m p l i e db y( ICe2)a n d( ICm). Constraint ΠG ≥ uL guarantees
that the agent prefers to implement the project after having obtained the good signal
rather than to choose y =1and m =0 . This constraint is implied by (ICe2)a n d
(ICm).
83 Motivating Managerial Eﬀort
As a benchmark solution, consider a setting in which the agent is not supposed to
evaluate the project. In this case, the sole motivational problem is with respect to
the managerial task. Moreover, assume it is commonly known that s = sG, i.e., the
project quality is good with probability (0.5+i) and bad with probability (0.5 − i).
The principal￿s problem (PB) is the following
max
mT,uH,uL
(0.5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)(0 − Φ(uL)) − I
o,
subject to
Π
PB ≡ (0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT ≥ uL, (ICPB)
Π
PB ≥ 0. (IRPB)
The incentive constraint (ICPB) ensures that the agent chooses m = mT instead
of m =0 . The individual rationality constraint (IRPB) ensures that the agent receives
his reservation utility of zero. The optimal solution to (PB) satis￿es
uH =
mT
0.5+i
,u L =0and (2)
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=Φ
0 (uH). (3)
(The proof is in Appendix A.) The outcome is not informative of the agent￿s action
if the project quality is bad. Similar to standard agency models, the contract must
impose some risk on the agent, uH >u L, in order to motivate the managerial task.
Since the agent is risk averse, he requires a risk premium that must be reimbursed by
the principal. In order to limit this cost, incentives are muted and the second-best
eﬀort level is below the ￿rst-best level. Moreover, the optimal eﬀort level is increasing
in the precision of the signal s. There are two reasons for this result. First, when
the precision i increases, uncertainty decreases because it becomes less likely that
the project fails although the agent has worked diligently. Hence, the required risk
premium decreases and it becomes less costly to provide strong incentives. Second,
9when i increases, it gets less likely that the managerial eﬀort is unproductive.6 Hence,
the principal ￿nds it advantageous to motivate a higher eﬀort level. (See Appendix
A for the proofs and for a more detailed discussion of these ￿ndings.)
The cost of motivating the managerial task can be avoided if the performance
measure M is available for contracting. In this case, the desired managerial input can
be enforced without imposing risk on the agent and the ￿rst-best solution is achieved.
Consequently, and consistent with standard agency problems, the informative perfor-
mance measure M is valuable to the ￿rm because it improves the risk sharing of the
contract.
Proposition 1 When the agent is involved in the managerial task only, the perfor-
mance measure M is valuable for contracting.
4M a i n R e s u l t s
W h i l et h ep e r f o r m a n c em e a s u r eM is always valuable if the agent is involved in the
managerial task only, this is not the case if the agent is involved in both the managerial
and the evaluation task. To determine the value of M, the easiest way to proceed
is to compare the optimal contract under the assumption that M is available (this
relaxed problem is called (Pr)) with the optimal contract under the assumption that
M is not available (problem (P)). If the optimal solution to (P) equals the optimal
solution to (P r), the performance measure M is not valuable to the ￿rm.
If the measure M is available for contracting, the sole motivational problem is
with respect to the evaluation task. The optimization problem (P r) is the following:
Maximize (T) subject to (ICe1), (ICe2)a n d( IR). The optimal solution to (Pr) is
given in the next lemma.
6Recall that the managerial eﬀort is unproductive when the project quality is bad.
10Lemma 1 The optimal solution to (Pr) satis￿es
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
,u 0 =0and (4)
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL). (5)
Proof: See Appendix B.
In order to provide incentives for the evaluation task, the principal must impose
risk on the agent, i.e., uH >u L. From constraints (ICe1)a n d( ICe2)i tf o l l o w st h a t
uH − mT >u 0 >u L − mT must hold. If, for example, uH − mT ≥ uL − mT >u 0,
the agent always implements the project or, if u0 >u H − mT ≥ uL − mT,a l w a y s
rejects the project without making an eﬀort to acquire better information. Note that
k
i can be used as a measure indicating the diﬃculty of providing incentives for the
evaluation task. When the agent￿s cost of gathering information, k, increases, the
control problem gets more severe. When, on the other hand, i increases, the incentive
problem gets less severe since the signal the agents is supposed to acquire gets less
noisy.
Consider now problem (P) in which the measure M is not available for contracting.
Lemma 2 The solution to (P) is such that either
(i) all constraints are binding except for (ICe1) or
(ii) all constraints are binding except for (ICm) or
(iii) all constraints are binding.
Proof: See Appendix B.
When the optimal solution to (P) satis￿es property (ii), the solution to (P) equals
the solution to the relaxed problem (Pr). Hence, Lemma 2 states that there are
situations in which the performance measure M is not valuable for contracting. It
remains to discuss when this is the case. Recall that constraint (ICm) is given by
u0 ≥ uL. This constraint becomes mT ≤ k
i if wage payments are as in (4). Note that
whenever this constraint is satis￿ed, cheating (m =0 )is not rewarding for the agent
11since uL ≤ 0. Constraint (ICm) is slack, if mT (determined by (4) and (5)) does not
exceed the critical level b m ≡ k
i. In this case, the measure M cannot be used to reduce
the noise in the contract since this would eliminate incentives for the evaluation task.
In other words, the performance measure M does not improve the risk sharing of
the contract and is therefore useless for contracting. The solution to (P) satis￿es
property (ii) if
Z(k,i) ≤ 0, (6)
with Z(k,i) ≡ (0.5+i)X
0 (b m) − (0.5+i)Φ
0 (2b m) − (0.5 − i)Φ
0(0).
Condition (6) is therefore a suﬃcient condition under which M is worthless for con-
tracting.7 To sum up: If (6) holds, the sole motivational problem is with respect
to the evaluation task. Since M is not informative of this task, it is useless for the
control problem.
Proposition 2 If (6) holds, the performance measure M is worthless for contracting
even though it is perfectly informative of the managerial task and the agent is risk
averse.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary 1
∂Z
∂k
< 0,
∂Z
∂i
> 0,
∂Z
∂v
> 0, for the case of X(m)=v b X(m),w h e r e b X is increasing and concave.
Condition (6) is more likely to hold if the cost of evaluating the project, k, is high
and the precision of the signal, i, and the productivity parameter, v,a r el o w .W h e n
7Note that (6) implies that the eﬀort level determined by (4) and (5) does not exceed the critical
level b m.
12k becomes high and i b e c o m e sl o w ,i ti sd i ﬃcult to motivate the evaluation task. A
low productivity v results in a low desired managerial eﬀort supply. Hence, when k
is high and i and v are low, the problem of motivating the evaluation task is severe
compared to the problem of motivating the managerial task so that the ￿rst incentive
problem is likely to dominate the second incentive problem.
If, on the other hand, condition (6) is not satis￿ed, constraint (ICm) is binding
in the optimal solution to (P). The motivational problem is then with respect to
both the evaluation and the managerial task. Since the measure M is informative of
the managerial task, it is useful for contracting. Similar to the single-task problem
of Section 3, the performance measure is valuable then because it improves the risk
sharing of the contract.
5 Robustness Considerations
In this section, I show that the main result that the performance measure M may be
useless for contracting is robust to other modeling assumptions.
Multiple Evaluation Eﬀort Choices: So far, I have assumed that the evaluation
eﬀort choice is binary. However, the model can be extended by allowing for multiple
evaluation eﬀort choices. Consider a setting in which the agent receives the signal
s with probability p(e) ∈ [0,1], where e is again the eﬀo r tt h ea g e n td e v o t e st ot h e
evaluation task. In other words, the agent chooses the probability of obtaining the
signal s by choosing the evaluation eﬀort level e. For simplicity, let p(e)=e, with
e ∈ [0,1]. The agent￿s private cost of exerting eﬀort e is 0.5ke2. Moreover, I assume
that if the agent does not obtain signal s, the principal wants the agent to reject the
project.
The ￿nding that M may be useless for contracting remains with this extension.
However, the critical eﬀort level changes and is now given by b m2 ≡ k
ie+0.5ke2, where
e is the agent￿s optimal response to the contract oﬀered by the principal. In Appendix
13C, I provide a formal statement of the problem under consideration and show that
(0.5+i)X
0 (b m2) ≤ (0.5+i)Φ
0
￿
2
k
i
e
¶
+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(0) (7)
is a suﬃcient condition under which the measure M is worthless. The measure M is
more likely to be worthless if, for example, the investment outlay Io becomes small.
In this case, the optimal evaluation eﬀort level e is high because the project becomes
more valuable to the principal. As a result, the problem of motivating the evaluation
task tends to dominate the problem of motivating the managerial task.
Lucky Agent: In the basic model, the principal is able to infer m = mT from
x = xT. The goal of this section is to show that the qualitative results discussed so
far are not an artifact of this simplifying assumption. To see this, assume that there
is a positive probability, say q, for which the outcome equals (or exceeds) the target
outcome, i.e., x ≥ xT, if the agent cheats on the managerial task and chooses m =0 .
Hence, in this case, if x ≥ xT, the principal cannot tell for sure whether the agent
has chosen m = mT or whether he has cheated and simply was lucky.
Given this additional assumption, constraint (ICm) of problem (P) becomes
u0 ≥ q(uH − uL)+uL. (ICnew
m )
This constraint implies that the critical level is now b m3 ≡ k
i(1 − 2q). The suﬃcient
condition under which M is worthless for contracting becomes
(0.5+i)X
0 (b m3) ≤ (0.5+i)Φ
0
￿
2
k
i
(1 − q)
¶
+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0
￿
−2q
k
i
¶
. (8)
(See Appendix C for the proofs.) Comparing (8) with (6) reveals that the performance
measure M is now less likely to be worthless. This result is intuitive since in the
current setting the performance measure has ￿more￿ information content than in the
setting discussed in Section 4.
14Wealth Constrained Agent: In many recent agency models, the agent is assumed
to have no private wealth (e.g., Lewis and Sappington 2000). An interesting question
is therefore whether wealth constraints on part of the agent aﬀect the main result of
this paper. Interestingly, this is not the case and Proposition 2 remains to hold.
When the agent is wealth constrained, the problem under consideration diﬀers
from (P) only in that it has additional nonnegativity constraints; wj ≥ 0 for j ∈
{H,L,0}. I provide the optimal solution to this problem in Appendix C. The optimal
solution is characterized by wL,w 0 =0and mT ≥ b m. The reason why the target
eﬀort supply is no lower than b m is that it serves an additional purpose: It provides
the agent with incentives to evaluate the project prior to implementation. These
incentives arise from the agent￿s wish to avoid wasting his managerial eﬀort for a
project of low quality.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the optimal design of contracts in a setting where the principal
wants to motivate a risk averse agent to evaluate a new project and, if adopted, to
manage it. I ￿nd that, contrary to what conventional agency literature suggests, a
performance measure that is informative of the managerial task may be completely
useless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. An informative perfor-
mance measure is typically valuable to the ￿rm because it can be used to improve the
risk sharing of the contract. In this two-task model, however, this result no longer
holds: Using the performance measure to reduce the risk imposed on the agent may
eliminate incentives for project evaluation. Hence, this paper provides a setting where
information content is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for a performance
measure to be valuable.
15Appendix A
First-best Solution
Consider problem (PB). If the performance measure M is available for contract-
ing, then there is no incentive problem. In this case, a forcing contract is possible
and the agent is asked to choose the desired action. The only constraint that must
be considered is the participation constraint (ICPB). The ￿rst-best managerial eﬀort
level is determined by m
f
T ≡ argmax
mT
{(0.5+i)X(mT)−Φ(mT)}. Hence, m
f
T satis￿es
(0.5+i)X
0(m
f
T)=Φ
0(m
f
T) (9)
and the compensation paid to the agent is Φ(m
f
T).
Problem (PB)
Let ￿1 ≥ 0 and ￿2 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with con-
straints (ICPB)a n d( IRPB). The Lagrangian of the problem (PB) is
max L =( 0 .5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)(0 − Φ(uL)) − I
o
+￿1((0.5+i)uH − (0.5+i)uL − mT)
+￿2((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT).
The necessary conditions for a solution to (PB) include:
∂L
∂uH
= −(0.5+i)Φ
0(uH)+￿1(0.5+i)+￿2(0.5+i)=0 , (10)
∂L
∂uL
= −(0.5 − i)Φ
0(uL) − ￿1(0.5+i)+￿2(0.5 − i)=0 , (11)
∂L
∂mT
=( 0 .5+i)X
0(mT) − ￿1 − ￿2 =0 . (12)
In the optimal solution to (PB) both (IRPB)a n d( ICPB) are binding, i.e., ￿1 > 0
and ￿2 > 0. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that ￿2 =0 . Then, (11) is violated
since Φ0(uL) > 0 and ￿1 ≥ 0. Suppose that ￿1 =0 . From (10) and (11) it follows
that uH = uL which violates (ICPB). Hence, in the optimal solution to (PB) the two
constraints are binding. This implies
uH =
mT
0.5+i
and uL =0 .
16From (10) and (12) it follows that (0.5+i)X0(mT)=Φ0(uH). Hence, the optimal
solution is given by (2) and (3), i.e.,
uH =
mT
0.5+i
,u L =0and
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=Φ
0
￿
mT
0.5+i
¶
.
The optimal solution can be nicely interpreted. First, note that the risk premium
is de￿ned as the diﬀerence between the expected wage payment and the security
equivalent and is given by
π =[ ( 0 .5+i)Φ(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ(uL)] − [Φ((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL)].
The security equivalent (the second term in square brackets) is the secure income for
which the agent enjoys the same utility as if he would receive the risky wages wH and
wL. Inserting (2) in π and rearranging yields
π =( 0 .5+i)Φ
￿
mT
0.5+i
¶
+( 0 .5 − i)Φ(0) − Φ(mT). (13)
The risk premium is zero if the agent is risk neutral (i.e., if u00(w)=0 ) 8 and/or
the signal s is perfect (i =0 .5). I ns u c has i t u a t i o n ,t h e￿rst-best solution can be
achieved. The risk premium is positive, if u00(w) < 0 and i<0.5.
Result 1: Let m∗
T be the optimal (second-best) eﬀort level. If the signal s is
imperfect (i<0.5), then m∗
T <m
f
T.
The proof follows directly from (3) and (9). Note that the agent￿s risk premium
(13) is increasing in mT,
∂π
∂mT
= Φ
0
￿
mT
0.5+i
¶
− Φ
0(mT) > 0. (14)
8The easiest way to see this is to consider the special case where u(w)=w.I nt h i sc a s e ,w(u)=u
and the risk premium simpli￿es to
π =( 0 .5+i)(
mT
0.5+i
)+( 0 .5 − i)(0) − (mT),
which is zero.
17While the optimal wage payment uH is increasing in mT,u L is independent of mT (see
(2)). Hence, the diﬀerence between the two, ∆u ≡ uH−uL, increases as mT increases.
Intuitively, if ∆u increases, the agent faces a higher risk and therefore requires a
higher risk premium.9 the principal trades oﬀ the cost of a high risk premium with
the bene￿to fah i g he ﬀort level. Since the agent requires a risk premium of zero in
the ￿rst-best situation, the optimal eﬀort level, m∗
T, is lower than the ￿rst-best eﬀort
level, m
f
T. In other words, the principal optimally mutes incentives in order to limit
the agent￿s risk premium.
Result 2: (a) m∗
T is increasing in the precision of the signal s, i.( b )T h ed i ﬀerence
between the ￿rst-best and second-best eﬀort level is decreasing in i, i.e.,
∂(m
f
T−m∗
T)
∂i <
0.
The proof follows directly from (3) and (9). Note that the risk premium (13) is
decreasing in the precision of the signal s, i.e.,
∂π
∂i
= Φ
￿
mT
0.5+i
¶
− Φ
0
￿
mT
0.5+i
¶
mT
0.5+i
− Φ(0) < 0.
(∂π
∂i is negative since Φ00 > 0.) As i increases, it becomes less likely that the agent
receives the low utility uL even though he chooses m = m∗
T. In other words, the risk
declines.10 Hence, the risk premium required by the agent decreases with i. Since
providing incentives becomes cheaper, the principal ￿nds it pro￿table to induce a
higher managerial eﬀort level mT. Note, however, that there is a second reason for
Result 2: The probability that the eﬀort has an impact on the outcome increases.
Remember, with probability (0.5 − i) the managerial eﬀort has no in￿uence on the
outcome because the project quality is bad, i.e., θ =0 . As it becomes more likely
that the eﬀort is productive, the principal wants to induce a higher eﬀort level. The
9Although the manager does not necessarily adapt himself to the variance, it is interesting to
note that the variance, δ
2 =( ∆u)2(0.5 − i)2, is increasing in ∆u.
10Note that the variance, δ
2 =( ∆u)2(0.5 − i)2, decreases with i.
18￿rst-best level, on the other hand, remains unchanged. Hence, Result 2b. If the signal
is perfect (i =0 .5), the ￿rst-best solution is achieved, m∗
T = m
f
T.
Assume that there are two agents, called A and B. As already mentioned, the
agent￿s required risk premium is increasing in ∆u. If one agent, say agent B, is more
risk averse than the other agent, A, it seems plausible to assume that the risk premium
πB of B increases more with an increasing ∆u than the risk premium πA of A does.
De￿nition 1 If
∂πB
∂∆u >
∂πA
∂∆u for all ∆u ≥ 0 and i<0.5, agent B is said to be more
risk averse than agent A.
Result 3: Let xTA ≡ X (mTA) and xTB ≡ X (mTB) be the required output agent
A and B is asked to provide, respectively. If agent B is more risk averse than agent
A, then (m
f
TB− m∗
TB) > (m
f
TA− m∗
TA) for all i ∈ (0,0.5).
Result 3 asserts that the diﬀerence between the ￿rst-best eﬀort level and the
second-best eﬀort level is higher for a more risk averse agent than for a less risk
averse agent. Given De￿nition 1, the risk premium of B is higher than for A for all
∆u>0.M o r ei m p o r t a n t l y ,f r o mD e ￿nition 1 it follows that
∂π2
∂mT
>
∂π1
∂mT
for all mT, (15)
since d∆u
deT > 0. Substituting the optimality condition (3) into (14) yields
∂π
∂mT
=( 0 .5+i)X
0(m
∗
T) − Φ
0(m
∗
T) > 0. (16)
Remember that the ￿rst-best solution satis￿es (0.5+i)X0(m
f
T)−Φ0(m
f
T)=0 . Hence,
from (15) it follows that (m
f
TB−m∗
TB) > (m
f
TA−m∗
TA). The greater the risk aversion
of the agent the greater is the diﬀerence between the ￿rst-best and the second-best
eﬀort level. Intuitively, it is more costly to provide incentives that are close to ￿rst-
best if the agent is more risk averse.
19Appendix B
The optimal solution to Problem (P) is as follows:
Lemma 3 The optimal solution to (P) is characterized by
(i)
uH =
mT +2 k
0.5+i
,u L = u0 =0 ,
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=Φ
0(uH)
and mT ≥
k
i
(All constraints are binding except for (ICe1).)
or (ii)
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
,u 0 =0 ,
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL)
and mT ≤
k
i
(All constraints are binding except for (ICm).)
or, if there does not exist a solution that satis￿es (i) or (ii), (iii)
uH =2
k
i
,u L =0 ,u 0 =0 ,
mT =
k
i
.
(All constraints are binding.)
Proof:
Let λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0 and λ4 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with constraints (ICe1), (ICe2), (ICm)a n d( IR). The Lagrangian of the
20problem (P) is the following
max L =0 .5[(0.5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)) + (0.5 − i)(0 − Φ(uL)) − I
o] − 0.5Φ(u0)
+λ1(mT + u0 − (0.5 − i)uH − (0.5+i)uL − 2k)
+λ2((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − u0 − mT − 2k)
+λ3(u0 − uL)
+λ4 ((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL + u0 − mT − 2k).
The necessary conditions for a solution to (P) include:
∂L
∂u0
= −0.5Φ
0(u0)+λ1 − λ2 + λ3 + λ4 =0 , (17)
∂L
∂uH
= −0.5(0.5+i)Φ
0(uH) − λ1(0.5 − i)+λ2(0.5+i)+λ4(0.5+i)=0 , (18)
∂L
∂uL
= −0.5(0.5 − i)Φ
0(uL) − λ1(0.5+i)+λ2(0.5 − i) − λ3 + λ4(0.5 − i) (19)
=0 , (20)
∂L
∂mT
=0 .5(0.5+i)X
0(mT)+λ1 − λ2 − λ4 =0 . (21)
From (18) and (19) it follows that
0.5Φ
0(uH) − 0.5Φ
0(uL)=λ1
2i
(0.5 − i)(0.5+i)
+ λ3
1
0.5 − i
. (22)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (18) and rearranging yields
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL)+2 λ3. (23)
In the optimal solution it must not be that λ1 = λ3 =0 . Because if λ1 = λ3 =0 ,
then (22) implies that uH = uL which violates either (ICe1)o r( ICe2).
In the optimal solution λ2 > 0, λ4 > 0, i.e., constraints (ICe2)a n d( IR)a r e
binding and, consequently, u0 =0 . The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that
λ2 = λ4 =0 . Then, (18) and (19) are violated since Φ0(uH) > 0 and Φ0(uL) > 0
and all Lagrangian multipliers are nonnegative. Suppose that λ2 > 0 and λ4 =0 .
Substituting (21) and (23) into (17) and rearranging yields
−0.5Φ
0(u0) − (0.5+i)0.5Φ
0(uH) − (0.5 − i)0.5Φ
0(uL)+2 λ4 =0 .
21Hence, if λ4 =0 , condition (17) is violated. Suppose that λ2 =0and λ4 > 0.
Substituting (18) into (17) yields
0.5Φ
0(u0) − 0.5Φ
0(uH)=λ1
￿
1
0.5+i
¶
− 2λ2 + λ3. (24)
If λ2 =0 , (24) implies u0 >u H. Note that (ICe1)a n d( ICe2)i m p l yuH >u L. Hence,
if λ2 =0 , then u0 >u H >u L which violates constraint (ICe2). Therefore, it must be
that λ2 > 0 and λ4 > 0 and u0 =0 .
Suppose that λ1 =0 . As already shown, in this case, it must be that λ3,λ2,λ4 > 0.
From λ3 > 0 it follows that constraint (ICm) is binding, i.e., u0 = uL =0 . Hence, the
participation constraint (IR) implies
uH =
mT +2 k
0.5+i
and u0 = uL =0 . (25)
From (19) and (21) and λ1 =0it follows that
λ3 = −(0.5 − i)0.5Φ
0(uL)+( 0 .5+i)(0.5 − i)0.5X
0(mT).
Inserting λ3 in (23) yields
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=Φ
0(uH). (26)
If the solution given by (25) and (26) satis￿es mT ≥ k
i, it is the optimal solution. In
this case, constraint (ICe1) is indeed slack, i.e., λ1 =0 .
Suppose that λ3 =0 . Hence, λ1,λ2,λ4 > 0. Since (ICe1), (ICe2)a n d( IR)a r e
binding, it follows that
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
and u0 =0 . (27)
Since λ3 =0 , (23) simpli￿es to
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL). (28)
If the solution given by (27) and (28) satis￿es mT ≤ k
i, it is the optimal solution. In
this case, constraint (ICm) is indeed slack, i.e., λ3 =0 .
22If the solution given by (25) and (26) does not satisfy mT ≥ k
i and the solution
given by (27) and (28) does not satisfy mT ≤ k
i, it must be that λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4 > 0.
Hence, all constraints are binding and the optimal solution is
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
,u 0 =0and
mT =
k
i
.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and Proposition 2
The proofs follow immediately from Lemma 3 and so are omitted.
Appendix C
Multiple Evaluation Eﬀort Choices
Let
Π2 ≡ e0.5[(0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT]+e0.5u0 +( 1− e)u0 − 0.5ke
2
denote the agent￿s ex ante utility. With this notation, the principal problem (P2) is
as follows
max
mT,uH,uL,u0
e0.5[(0.5+i)(X(mT)−Φ(uH))+(0.5−i)(−Φ(uL))−I
o]−e0.5Φ(u0)−(1−e)Φ(u0)
subject to
(0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT − u0 − 2ke =0 , (ICP2
e )
u0 ≥ 0.5uH +0 .5uL − mT, (ICP2
r )
u0 ≥ uL, (ICP2
m )
Π2 ≥ 0. (IRP2)
Constraint (ICP2
e )i st h ea g e n t ￿ s￿rst-order condition on evaluation eﬀort e.( I
assume that the optimal eﬀort e is in the interior of the action set.) Condition (ICP2
r )
23ensures that the agent will reject the project if he does not obtain the signal s.
Constraint (ICP2
m ) ensures that the agent prefers to reject the project rather than to
cause a project failure by choosing y =1and m =0 .C o n s t r a i n t( IRP2) ensures that
the agent receives his reservation utility of zero in expectation. Similar to problem
(P), there are several other constraints I have omitted since they are implied by
(ICP2
e ), (ICP2
r ), (ICP2
m ) and (IRP2).
Consider in the following the relaxed problem (P2r) in which constraint (ICP2
m )i s
suppressed. If the solution to the relaxed problem (P2r) satis￿es condition (ICP2
m ),
the measure M is worthless for contracting.
Let λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 and λ3 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with
constraints (ICP2
e ), (ICP2
r )a n d( IRP2). The Lagrangian of problem (P2r) is the
following
max L = e0.5[(0.5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)) + (0.5 − i)(−Φ(uL)) − I
o]
−Φ(u0)(1 − 0.5e)
+λ1(0.5[(0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT − u0] − ke)
+λ2(u0 − 0.5uH − 0.5uL + mT)
+λ3
¡
e0.5[(0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT]+u0(1 − 0.5e) − 0.5ke
2¢
.
24The necessary conditions for a solution to (P2r) include:
∂L
∂u0
= −Φ
0(u0)(1 − 0.5e) − λ10.5+λ2 + λ3(1 − 0.5e)=0 , (29)
∂L
∂uH
= −e0.5(0.5+i)Φ
0(uH)+λ10.5(0.5+i) − λ20.5+λ3e0.5(0.5+i)=0 , (30)
∂L
∂uL
= −e0.5(0.5 − i)Φ
0(uL)+λ10.5(0.5 − i) − λ20.5+λ3e0.5(0.5 − i)=0 , (31)
∂L
∂mT
= e0.5(0.5+i)X
0(mT) − λ10.5+λ2 − λ3e0.5=0 , (32)
∂L
∂e
=0 .5((0.5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)) + (0.5 − i)(−Φ(uL)) − I
o) (33)
+0.5Φ(u0) − λ1k + λ3 (0.5((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − mT − u0) − ke)
=0 .
In the optimal solution to (P2r),i tm u s tb et h a tλ2 > 0. The proof is by contra-
diction. From (30) and (31) it follows that
e(Φ
0(uH) − Φ
0(uL)) = λ2
2i
(0.5 − i)(0.5+i)
. (34)
If λ2 =0 , (34) implies that uH = uL for e>0. Substituting uH = uL into constraint
(ICP2
e ) yields u0 = uH−mT−2ke which contradicts condition (ICP2
r ). Hence, λ2 > 0.
Since (ICP2
r ) binds and due to condition (ICP2
e ), it follows that
uH = mT + u0 +
k
i
e and uL = mT + u0 −
k
i
e.
Substituting (34) and (32) into (30) and rearranging yields
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL).
In the optimal solution it must be that λ3 > 0. The proof is by contradiction.
Substituting (32) into (29) and rearranging yields
∂L
∂u0
= −Φ
0(u0)(1 − 0.5e) − 0.5e(0.5+i)X
0(mT)+λ3 =0 ,
which cannot be satis￿es for λ3 =0since Φ0(u0) > 0 and X0(mT) > 0.H e n c e ,λ3 > 0.
25From constraint (ICP2
e ) and from the participation constraint (IRP2)( w h i c hi s
binding) it follows that
u0 = −0.5ke
2.
If in the optimal solution to (P2r),u L is nonpositive, then (ICP2
m )i ss a t i s ￿ed
and the measure M is worthless for contracting. Hence, condition (7) is a suﬃcient
condition under which M is useless.
Lucky Manager
The problem (called (P3)) is now as follows: Maximize (T)s u b j e c tt o( ICe1),
(ICe2), (ICnew
m )a n d( IR). The optimal solution to (P3) is given in the next lemma.
Lemma 4 The optimal solution to (P3) is characterized by (i)
uH =
mT +2 k
(0.5+i) − (0.5 − i)
q
1−q
,u L = −
q(mT +2 k)
0.5+i − q
,u 0 =0 ,
(0.5+i)
0.5+i − q
1 − q
X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH) − (0.5 − i)
q
1 − q
Φ
0(uL),
and mT ≥
k
i
(1 − 2q),
or (ii)
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
,u 0 =0 ,
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL),
and mT ≤
k
i
(1 − 2q),
or, if there does not exist a solution that satis￿es (i) or (ii), (iii)
uH =2
k
i
(1 − q),u L = −2q
k
i
,u 0 =0 ,
mT =
k
i
(1 − 2q).
The proof is similar to the proof in Appendix B and so is omitted. Similar to
problem (P), if the solution to problem (P3) satis￿es property (ii), then constraint
(ICnew
m ) is not binding and the measure M is worthless for contracting.
26Wealth Constrained Agent
The problem in which the agent is wealth constrained (called (P4)) is similar to
problem (P) but has additional constraints: wH,w L,w 0 ≥ 0. Note that, since w0 ≥ 0,
the participation constraint (IR) is implied by constraint (ICe2) and is therefore
omitted in the following. Let η1 ≥ 0, η2 ≥ 0 and η3 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with constraints (ICe1), (ICe2)a n d( ICm). The Lagrangian of
the problem (P4) is the following
max L =0 .5[(0.5+i)(X(mT) − Φ(uH)) + (0.5 − i)(0 − Φ(uL)) − I
o] − 0.5Φ(u0)
+η1(mT + u0 − (0.5 − i)uH − (0.5+i)uL − 2k)
+η2((0.5+i)uH +( 0 .5 − i)uL − u0 − mT − 2k)
+η3(u0 − uL).
The necessary conditions for a solution to (P4) include:
∂L
∂u0
≤ 0 and u0 ≥ 0 and
∂L
∂u0
u0 =0 , (35)
where
∂L
∂u0
= −0.5Φ
0(u0)+η1 − η2 + η3,
∂L
∂uH
≤ 0 and uH ≥ 0 and
∂L
∂uH
uH =0 , (36)
where
∂L
∂uH
= −0.5(0.5+i)Φ
0(uH) − η1(0.5 − i)+η2(0.5+i),
∂L
∂uL
≤ 0 and uL ≥ 0 and
∂L
∂uL
uL =0 , (37)
where
∂L
∂uL
= −0.5(0.5 − i)Φ
0(uL) − η1(0.5+i)+η2(0.5 − i) − η3,
∂L
∂mT
≤ 0 and mT ≥ 0 and
∂L
∂mT
mT =0 , (38)
where
∂L
∂mT
=0 .5(0.5+i)X
0(mT)+η1 − η2.
Consider the relaxed problem (P4r) in which constraint (ICm) is suppressed. If
the solution to the relaxed problem (P4) satis￿es condition (ICm), the measure M is
worthless for contracting. The optimal solution to (P4r) i sg i v e ni nt h en e x tl e m m a .
27Note that from this lemma it follows that (6) is a suﬃcient condition under which M
is worthless for contracting.
Lemma 5 The optimal solution to (P4r) is either (i)
uH = mT +
k
i
,u L = mT −
k
i
,u 0 =0 , (39)
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL)
and mT ≥
k
i
.
or, if there does not exist a solution that satis￿es (i), (ii)
uH =2
k
i
,u L = u0 =0and mT =
k
i
. (40)
Proof: In the relaxed problem (P4r) constraint (ICm) is dropped, i.e., η3 =0 .
Next, it is shown that in the optimal solution to (P4r) constraints (ICe1)a n d( ICe2)
are binding, i.e., η1 > 0 and η2 > 0. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that
η1 =0 . From (36) and (37) it follows that uH = uL. This violates either constraint
(ICe1)o rc o n s t r a i n t( ICe2). Suppose that η2 =0 . Then from (36) and (37) it follows
that uH = uL =0 . This violates constraint (ICe2). Hence, η1 > 0 and η2 > 0 must
hold which implies that (ICe1)a n d( ICe2) are binding.
Note that since X0(0) >> 0, it must be that mT > 0. Hence, from (38) it follows
that ∂L
∂mT =0 .5(0.5+i)X0(mT)+η1 − η2 =0 . Substituting this into (35) yields
∂L
∂u0
= −0.5Φ
0(u0) − 0.5(0.5+i)X
0(mT) < 0.
Since ∂L
∂u0 < 0, from (35) it follows that u0 =0 . Since (ICe1)a n d( ICe2) are binding
and u0 =0 , it follows that
uH = mT +
k
i
and uL = mT −
k
i
and u0 =0 . (41)
Since uH > 0, it follows from (36) that ∂L
∂uH =0 . Simplifying and rearranging yields
η2 =0 .5Φ
0(uH)+η1
0.5 − i
0.5+i
. (42)
28Since X0(0) >> 0, it must be that mT > 0. Hence, ∂L
∂mT =0(see (38)), that is,
0.5(0.5+i)X
0(mT)+η1 − η2 =0 . (43)
Inserting (42) in (43) and rearranging yields
η1 =( Φ
0(uH) − (0.5+i)X
0(mT))
0.5+i
4i
. (44)
Inserting (42) and (44) in (37) and rearranging yields
(0.5+i)X
0(mT) ≤ (0.5+i)Φ
0(uH)+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0(uL). (45)
The optimal solution is given by (41) and
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=( 0 .5+i)Φ
0
￿
mT +
k
i
¶
+( 0 .5 − i)Φ
0
￿
mT −
k
i
¶
if mT ≥ k
i. Otherwise, the optimal solution is given by (41) and mT = k
i.
For the sake of completeness, the optimal solution to (P4) i sg i v e ni nt h en e x t
lemma
Lemma 6 The optimal solution to (P4) is characterized by either (i)
uH =
mT +2 k
0.5+i
,u L = u0 =0 ,
(0.5+i)X
0(mT)=Φ
0(uH)
and mT ≥ b m,
or, if there does not exist a solution that satis￿es (i), (ii)
uH =2b m and uL = u0 =0and mT = b m.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 and so is omitted.
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